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ABSTRACT 
Using the regression discontinuity design of close gubernatorial elections in 
the U.S., we identify a significant and positive impact of the social networks of 
corporate directors and politicians on firm value. Firms connected to elected 
governors increase their value by 3.89%. Political connections are more valuable 
for firms connected to winning challengers, for smaller and financially dependent 
firms, in more corrupt states, in states of connected firms’ headquarters and 
operations, and in closer, smaller, and active networks. Post-election, firms 
connected to the winner receive significantly more state procurement contracts and 
invest more than do firms connected to the loser.  
 
Keywords: Social networks; political connection; firm value; regression 
discontinuity design; close gubernatorial election; corruption; procurement. 
 
JEL Classifications: G3, G28, G30, G34, G38. 
 
 
 
 
We thank Ken Ahern, Vineet Bhagwat, Vincente Cuñat, D’Maris Coffman, Brandon Julio, Chris Parsons, Kelly Shue, 
Martin Schmalz, Michael Roberts, Kelsey Wei, three anonymous referees, and participants at Econometric Society 
Asian Meeting 2014, London Business School Summer Finance Symposium 2014, Microsoft Cambridge Research 
Workshop on Games, Learning, and Markets 2014, American Economic Association Meeting 2013, European Finance 
Association Meeting 2013, European Economic Association Meeting 2013, Financial Management Association 
Meeting 2013, Society of Financial Studies Finance Cavalcade 2013, UNC-Duke Corporate Finance Conference 2013, 
Asia-Pacific Economic Association Meeting 2012, Cambridge-Penn-Tinbergen Annual Finance Conference 2012, 
SMU-ESSEC Workshop on Financial Economics 2012, and seminar participants at the Sim Kee Boon Institute for 
Financial Economics, University of Bristol, and Stockholm University for helpful comments. We acknowledge SFS 
Finance Cavalcade 2013 Best Paper Award in Corporate Finance sponsored by Harley Lippman. We are grateful to 
Diego Garcia and Øyvind Norli for providing us with the data on the geographic operational diversity of U.S. firms 
and to Florian Heider and Alexander Ljungqvist for sharing their codes to correct for Compustat’s firm headquarters. 
Do acknowledges support from the French National Research Agency’s (ANR) “Investissements d’Avenir” grants 
ANR-11-LABX-0091 (LIEPP) and ANR-11-IDEX-0005-02, and from the Sim Kee Boon Institute for Financial 
Economics at Singapore Management University. Nguyen acknowledges financial support from the University of 
Cambridge through a University Travel Grant. All errors remain our own. 
 
* Department of Economics & LIEPP, Sciences Po, Paris 75007, France. Tel: (+33) 1 4549 8358; E-mail: 
quocanh.do@sciencespo.fr.  
 
** School of Finance, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China. Tel: (+86) 21 6590 
1438; E-mail:  lee.yenteik@sufe.edu.cn. 
 
*** Finance and Accounting Group, University of Cambridge Judge Business School, Cambridge CB2 1AG, U.K. Tel: 
(+44) 1223 760 740; Fax: (+44) 1223 339 701; E-mail: b.nguyen@jbs.cam.ac.uk.  
1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION
Do political connections impact firm value? The answer to this question yields crucial 
implications for shareholder value, corporate governance, institutional design, and incentive 
mechanisms for politicians and firms. Although abundant anecdotal evidence in the media 
suggests positive benefits of political connections, conducting research to prove, disprove, or 
generalize the relationship between political connections and firm value remains challenging. As 
with many topics in corporate finance, studies of political connections have to overcome the 
endogeneity issue, which prevents the precise identification and quantification of the impact of 
these connections.1 In the U.S., the rarity of direct links of ownership or concurrent employment 
between corporations and politicians—resulting from the strict regulations and disclosure regime, 
as well as a high level of transparency—makes identifying potential political connections and 
gathering sufficient data and observations for empirical studies even more challenging. 
Our paper attempts to address these challenges by investigating the value of political 
connections in the U.S., where institutions rank among the best, and the line between politics 
and business is among the clearest.2 Any significant result we might find should, therefore, 
represent an underestimation of the value of political connections in other parts of the world 
that have a lower quality of institutions and governance. 
We define political connections broadly by following a social network approach, as 
proposed by Bertrand et al. (2008), Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008), Fracassi and Tate (2012), 
Nguyen (2012), and Shue (2013). A firm is connected to a politician if one of its directors shares 
the same educational background with a politician. This definition represents a few advantages. 
First, the connections from the network of classmates and alumni are clearly and unambiguously 
defined based on publicly available information on educational backgrounds of all politicians and 
directors. Second, this network’s coverage is broad enough to be representative of the 
population of politicians and directors and to avoid obvious and specific political connections 
that are subject to latent conflicts of interest, making it possible to generalize the empirical 
results. Third, alumni and classmate networks also play a particularly important role in American 
society. Educational institutions received as much as $41.67 billion in 2010, or 14% of all 
                                                 
1 See Roberts and Whited (2013) for an overview of the endogeneity issues in empirical corporate finance 
and their solutions, including the regression discontinuity design.   
2 The United States ranks in the first decile in control of corruption, rule of law, regulatory quality, and 
government effectiveness in the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2011) 
in 2000-2008. 
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charitable donations, second only to religious organizations (Giving USA Foundation, 2011.)3 
Our classmate-based connections might draw questions about the realistic nature of such 
connections, as, in actuality, not all classmates are friends (e.g., Leider et al. 2009). This factor, 
however, should not alter the significance of our results. Any measurement errors in this instance 
imply that the effect of real friendships is nuanced by many non-friend classmate social ties, thus 
producing an attenuation bias that reduces the absolute size of the estimate and its statistical 
significance. The effect of real friendships can thus be larger than that found in this paper. On 
the other hand, classmate connections can be primordial in the development of relationships 
after college or graduate school by providing the conditions for common communication and 
mutual trust as well as common access to the same social network (e.g., Shue 2013). Former 
classmates are thus more likely to later develop a strong connection, even if they were not close 
friends while in college or graduate school.  
To identify the value of social network-based political connections, we propose a new 
empirical strategy. We study a sample of firms connected to candidates in close gubernatorial 
elections. Lee (2008) shows that close elections can be considered a Regression Discontinuity 
Design (RDD), a natural experiment that produces near-randomized-trial identification with 
great internal validity. That is, a connection to a politician elected to office by a small margin is at 
the limit identical to a connection to one defeated by a small margin.  Their comparison in RDD 
identifies a consistent estimate that accounts for all potential confounding factors, be they 
observable or unobservable. This empirical design has gained popularity in labor, political, and 
development economics (see Lee and Lemieux 2010), but only recently in corporate finance 
(examples include Chava and Roberts 2008; Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe 2012; and Kerr, Lerner, 
and Schoar 2014.) 
The RDD specification provides a treatment effect estimate of the stock-market value of 
a new connection to a governor, where the treatment is one that exogenously elects a firm’s 
connected politician as governor, as opposed to not electing him. Given the identification 
strength, we vary the subsample of RDD by covariates to understand the value of governor 
                                                 
3 We abstract from connections based on political contributions (e.g., Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov 
2010, Akey 2013) because clear links between firms and specific politicians are difficult to establish. Before 2010, 
firms cannot make direct contributions to politicians; they can only initiate an independently run political action 
committees (PAC), which channels individual donations from shareholders and employees to both major parties and 
their committees, other PACs and Super-PACs. Its contribution to a single specific candidate’s committee is limited 
at $2,600 a year. Hence for most candidates, campaign finance that is identified as coming from a specific firm’s 
associated PAC is only a tiny fraction of total campaign expenses. In our study, we control for total campaign 
contributions from all sources, with no effect on the estimates. 
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connections across different firms, industries and states. The strength of RDD also offsets a 
potential weakness of traditional event studies, in that we correctly estimate the value of 
connection even if the market misestimates the probability of event. Event-study techniques are 
still used in our approach only to improve estimation efficiency, and are not essential to the 
results. 
Following Lee and Lemieux (2010), the specification estimates a Weighted Average 
Treatment Effect (WATE), where each politician’s weight is his relative propensity to experience 
a very close election. While some politicians are less likely to have that experience than others, 
the inclusion of highly visible politicians such as Janet Napolitano in our sample suggests that 
our estimate can cover a broad share of the population of politicians, and is therefore 
generalizable to the sample of all politicians with a nonzero chance of experiencing a close 
election.  
To further clarify the impact of the social networks of corporate directors and politicians 
on firm value, we study the robustness of our results to potential network homophily. 
Homophily, as first defined in sociology, refers to the phenomenon that people sharing the same 
characteristics are more likely to join the same network, thus confounding the effect of 
connections with the effect of shared characteristics (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001.) 
Close election RDD still has a caveat in dealing with homophily, because potential beneficial 
policies may arise from common characteristics of the connected firm, director, and politician. 
We propose a new approach to tackle potential homophily bias by introducing interactions of 
school fixed effects with a dummy for schools with a winner, election year fixed effects, and 
winning industry fixed effects, in order to control for such potential beneficial policies. We find 
sensibly similar results, and ascertain that the discovered effects come from political connections, 
not shared characteristics. We also find stronger effects of connections among former classmates 
versus among alumni from far-apart graduation years (similar to results in Cohen, Frazzini, and 
Malloy 2008; Fracassi 2009; Nguyen 2012), and stronger effects in years of alumni reunions (as 
first tested in Shue 2013). Taken together, our identification strategy can shed light on social 
connections between governors and corporate directors. 
We obtain data on gubernatorial elections from 1999 to 2010 from the Federal Election 
Commission, from which we filter in only elections of a winning margin within 5% between the 
winner and the loser. We manually collect details of all politicians’ educational backgrounds from 
the web archives of their campaigns, a process made difficult by the search for less prominent 
defeated candidates. On the director side, we obtain past education history for directors of 
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public firms in the U.S. from BoardEx of Management Diagnostics Limited. We then form all 
pairs between close-election candidates (elected or defeated) and directors who graduated from 
the same educational institution (same campus) within one year of each other, and link each pair 
to the stock performance of the firm around the date of the politician’s close election.4 Each 
observation thus matches a firm’s cumulative abnormal return on the event window to the win 
or loss status of the candidate who shares an educational background with a director of the firm. 
Our study provides a number of findings. First, political connections positively and 
significantly impact firm value. Firms connected to the winner in a close gubernatorial election 
experience a positive and significant average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of 3.89% over 
and above the CAR of firms connected to the loser. The effect is robust to alternative 
specifications in the event windows and in the market models, and across sub-samples. Second, 
the value of political connections varies with candidate characteristics, state-level corruption, and 
firm and network characteristics. Political connections are more valuable for firms connected to 
winning challengers, for winning challengers without federal experiences before elections, in 
challenger-only elections, in states with higher levels of corruption, in states of connected firms’ 
headquarters and corporate operations, in smaller firms, and in firms dependent on external 
finance. Political connections are more valuable when the connections are closer, more exclusive, 
and fresh from network reunions. Third, political connections exert real impact on firms. 
Following close elections, firms connected to the winner receive significantly more state 
procurement contracts and invest more than do firms connected to the loser.  
While our paper is not the first to ask the question of the value of political connections, 
nor the first to try to tackle their underlying endogeneity, we contribute to the literature along 
several lines. First, we propose a new approach to measuring political connections based on the 
social networks of candidates to governorship and directors of listed firms. This approach does 
not exclude potential direct political connections in the prior literature and allows us to have a 
relatively sizable and fairly representative sample of politically connected firms, even in the 
context of the U.S., making our results generalizable.5 Our paper thus contributes to the growing 
literature on the impact of social ties on various finance topics (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 
                                                 
4 We do not construct links between people previously working in the same firm, as only a few in our 
sample of politicians have previously worked in a publicly listed firm. 
5 While the number of close elections is not large due to the nature of our experiment, our estimates’ 
precision also comes from the number of firms. The number of connected firms and close elections in our sample 
compares favorably to prior papers (i.e., Faccio 2006, Goldman, Rocholl, and So 2009). Our results remain 
consistent to all possible levels of clustering, including double-clustering (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2011), and 
to the exclusion of outliers. 
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2008; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu 2007, 2010; Allen and Babus 2009; Fracassi 2009; Kuhnen 
2009; Jackson 2009; Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons 2012; Nguyen 2012; Lerner and Malmendier 
2013; Shue 2013; and Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons, forthcoming, among others.) 
Second, we propose a robust identification to the endogenous relationship between 
political connections and corporate outcomes. Extant literature studies extensively the value of 
political connections through events that happen independently of political connections. Knight 
(2007) and Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2009, 2013) exploit close elections in presidential races in 
the U.S.; Roberts (1990), Jayachandran (2006), Fisman et al. (2006), and Blanes i Vidal, Draca, 
and Fons-Rosen (2012) use news and events related to prominent American politicians; while 
Fisman (2001), Johnson and Mitton (2003), Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2009), 
Ferguson and Voth (2008), and Imai and Shelton (2011) study political events in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand, Nazi Germany, and Taiwan. This strategy avoids the direct reverse causation 
channel in which political connections result from politicians’ power and strong politicians are 
connected to strong firms’ directors, and both become successful. However, as discussed by 
Snowberg, Wolfers, and Zitzewitz (2007), many caveats persist, notably that of the unobservable 
prior probability of each event. The use of prediction markets as a helpful fix is unfortunately 
only limited to important events such as American presidential elections; it thus restricts the 
scope and undermines the generalizability of such analysis.  
Other studies using non-political firm-related events including appointments of directors 
(Faccio 2006; Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2009), bailouts (Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 
2006), and IPOs (Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2007) are subject to the endogeneity concern that 
these events are partly triggered by certain unobservable characteristics of the firms. Other 
papers relying on fixed effects and difference-in-difference strategies, such as Khwaja and Mian 
(2005), Dinç (2005), Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006), Bertrand et al. (2008), Claessens, Feijen, 
and Laeven (2008), and Li et al. (2008), are prone to biases induced by time-varying 
characteristics of firms or parties. While prior papers undertake various robustness checks to 
verify the causality channel, few treat the endogeneity of connections. The possibility of 
unobserved firm and elected politicians’ characteristics affecting both corporate outcomes and 
political connections remains extremely hard to rule out.  
The potential problems related to the measurement of political connections and various 
forms of endogeneity and reverse causality, mentioned above, might explain the inconclusive 
insights from the prior literature. While a large number of papers find that political connections 
increase firm value in a specific country (e.g., Fisman 2001 on Indonesia; Johnson and Mitton 
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2003 on Malaysia; Khwajia and Mian 2005 on Pakistan; Goldman, Rocholl, and So 2009 on the 
U.S.) or in a cross-country sample (e.g., Faccio 2006 and Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell 2006), 
other papers do not find any significant impact of political connections on firm value (i.e., 
Fisman et al. 2006; Roberts 1990). 
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is among the first to use the regression 
discontinuity design of close gubernatorial elections to address the endogeneity and reverse 
causality of political connections. As detailed in the following section, our framework deals with 
both the endogeneity of the connected politician and the potential selection bias in networks due 
to homophily, providing a powerful internal validity of the empirical results. Moreover, the 
estimated effect is a WATE across the sample of all politicians susceptible to experiencing a 
close election, and across sampled firms, which are comparable to Compustat’s universe. This 
property reinforces the external validity of the paper’s findings, making it reasonable to 
generalize the conclusions to the population of all firms and politicians. 
Our third contribution is the finding of a consistent and positive impact of political 
connections on firm value in the U.S., particularly at the state level, and the variation of the value 
of connections across different states, firms, and network characteristics. Our statistically robust 
and economically significant results complement international evidence in extant literature on 
value-enhancing political connections (e.g., Fisman 2001, Faccio 2006, Faccio, Masulis, and 
McConnell 2006) and enriches evidence from the U.S. that focused mainly on the benefits of 
political connections to parties and at the federal level (e.g. Goldman, Rocholl, and So 2013). In 
a recent paper, Do et al. (2014) apply a similar method to U.S. Congress elections to show that 
the value of political connection is higher for state-level politicians, compared to new 
congressmen. 
The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the methodology. Section 
3 describes the data. Section 4 reports the empirical results. Section 5 explores possible 
interpretations and channels of the results. Section 6 reports robustness checks. Section 7 
concludes. 
2. IDENTIFICATION AND EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
2.1 REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY DESIGN OF CLOSE ELECTIONS 
An estimation of the impact of political connections on firm value should overcome a 
reverse causation channel when a well-performing firm may be able to help its connected 
politicians win elections, or an omitted variable bias when connected firms and politicians are 
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affected by the same unobservable factor, such as a shift in public opinion. The reverse causation 
and endogeneity bias are best eliminated with a randomization of the assignment of a politician 
to office. If the politician is chosen randomly, no concern exists about either the reverse 
causation of firm value changes or the influence of some omitted variables. It is, however, 
extremely difficult to find a randomized experiment on political connection. Lee’s (2008) 
pioneering work on Regression Discontinuity Designs (RDD) shows that the event of winning 
close to the vote threshold of 50% is randomized between the winner and the loser as in a 
randomized experiment, and that, conditional on the election being close, the incidence of 
winning or losing is independent of all observable and unobservable characteristics of the 
politician before the election. The RDD thus allows an estimation of the average treatment effect 
of connections to elected politicians versus defeated politicians without any reverse causation or 
omitted variable bias, ensuring the internal validity of the results. Results from the RDD are also 
externally valid and generalizable. Lee and Lemieux (2010) point out that the RDD estimate is 
not only informative for close elections but also for all elections. The estimate can be interpreted 
as a weighted average treatment effect of being politically connected, where each politician’s 
weight is her ex ante likelihood to be in a close gubernatorial election, which is nontrivial for 
most American politicians. Even very powerful politicians can be subject to close gubernatorial 
elections, as Arizona’s Janet Napolitano experienced in 2002.6 
Our identification strategy has a key advantage in comparison with event studies. 
Traditional event studies rely on the event’s exogeneity and the accuracy of the market’s prior 
beliefs, unavailable except in prediction markets (see discussions in Fisman 2001, and Snowberg, 
Wolfers, and Zitzewitz  2007). In contrast, our design is always valid even if the market’s prior 
belief is largely incorrect. Indeed, suppose that the market believes in a winning probability of 
65% instead of the correct probability of 50%. For $100 of perceived value of winning, the pre-
event connection will be priced by the market, incorrectly, at $65. The post-event market 
reaction to a realized win is $35, and that to a realized loss is negative $65. An event study 
focused on election wins may report the underestimated value of $35. 7  However, RDD 
                                                 
6 In political science, Snyder (2005), Caughey and Sekhon (2011), and Grimmer et al. (2012) raise the 
concern of potentially predictable (non-random) sorting of winners and losers in close U.S. House elections after 
World War II. However, in a thorough and extensive examination of more than 40,000 close elections obtained 
from a longer period in the U.S. and from other countries, Eggers et al. (2015) provide systemic evidence of no 
sorting, and claimed that the mentioned concern likely happened by pure chance. Our Tables 10 and 11 provide 
extensive robustness checks on randomness and RDD required conditions. 
7 A more sophisticated study may report $35/50% = $70, assuming a market’s prior belief at 50%. Without 
knowledge of the market’s belief, no event study could estimate the correct value of $100. 
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estimation still produces, correctly, the difference of $35-(-$65) = $100, exactly the right value of 
having a connection to an elected politician. (See the appendix and Lee and Lemieux 2010 for 
more details.) 
In addition to the cross-sectional identification by RDD, time-series identification from 
event-study market models is used to calculate stock price’s Cumulated Abnormal Returns 
(CARs). However, while the use of CARs improves estimation efficiency by reducing market 
noises, it is not essential to our results, thanks to the near-random nature of RDD assignments.  
We design two main econometric specifications to estimate the effect of political 
connection. Each observation represents a connection between a close-election’s top-two 
candidates and a connected firm’s director through a specific university program for a given 
election year. The dependent variable is a connected firm’s cumulated abnormal return (CAR) in 
a window around the election day. We thus combine the strength of event studies with RDD to 
reduce market noise in stock returns. The treatment variable is an indicator for whether a firm is 
connected to the winner in a close race. 
Following Lee and Lemieux (2010), the first specification that we mainly use is an OLS 
regression of the outcome variable (CAR) on the treatment variable (Winner), controlling for the 
vote shares of elected politicians and defeated politicians, where the sample is limited to all races 
with a vote margin smaller than 5%. That is, we obtain the OLS estimate ߚመ  in the following 
equation, where ܸ ௜ܵ stands for vote share: 
ܥܣܴ௜ ൌ ߚܹ݅݊݊݁ݎ௜ ൅ ߜௐܸ ௜ܵ૚ሼ௏ௌ೔ஹହ଴%ሽ ൅ ߜ௅ܸ ௜ܵ૚ሼ௏ௌ೔ழହ଴%ሽ ൅ ߝ௜.   (1) 
The treatment variable Winner is an indicator equal to one if a firm is connected to the 
winner and to zero if a firm is connected to the loser. Standard errors are calculated from the 
OLS regression, and are clustered at the politician level for each election. In our robustness 
checks, we include a cubic polynomial of the vote shares, as well as other levels of clustering. 
We also perform robustness checks using nonparametric regressions of the outcome 
variable on the treatment variable on two separate subsamples, of elected politicians and of 
runners-up. Predictions of the outcome variable are calculated at the threshold of 50% for each 
sample, and their difference is reported. Technically, we run nonparametric local (cubic) 
polynomial regressions of the equation: 
ܥܣܴ௜ ൌ ܨሺܸ݋ݐ݄݁ܵܽݎ݁௜ሻ ൅ ߝ௜        (2) 
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on the subsample where ܸ݋ݐ݄݁ܵܽݎ݁௜ ൏ 50% to estimate the function ܨ෠ି ሺ. ሻ and on the 
subsample where ܸ݋ݐ݄݁ܵܽݎ݁௜ ൐ 50% to obtain ܨ෠ାሺ. ሻ . The estimated effect is calculated as 
ܨ෠ାሺ50%ሻ െ ܨ෠ି ሺ50%ሻ.8 
Our connections based on all pairs of classmates might draw questions about the realistic 
nature of those connections, as most people actually have only a small number of friends among 
classmates (see, e.g., Leider et al. 2009). Classmate connection levels, however, should not be a 
concern to the significance of our results. The measurement errors in this case imply that the 
effect of real friendships is nuanced by many non-friend classmate connections, producing an 
attenuation bias that reduces the absolute size of the estimate and its statistical significance. The 
effect of real friendships can thus be even larger than those found in this paper. On the other 
hand, classmate connections can be primordial in the development of relationships after college 
or graduate school by providing the conditions for common communication and mutual trust as 
well as common access to the same social network. Former classmates are thus more likely to 
later develop a strong connection, even if they were not close friends while in college or graduate 
school. Several recent papers have shown the strength of this measure of connections in many 
contexts (Cohen, Frazzini, Malloy 2008; Fracassi 2009; Nguyen 2012; and Shue 2013). 
2.2 POTENTIAL ISSUE OF HOMOPHILY 
While firms’ links to elected governors are identified as an almost-random treatment in 
our context, the empirical strategy so far still tolerates the potential alternative interpretation of 
homophily of social networks (people are more likely connected because they share the same 
characteristics.) This interpretation works as follows. Future politicians and directors sharing 
similar characteristics and preferences may have been drawn together at the same university. 
Decades later, the elected politician may enact policies in favor of these same characteristics, on 
which the connected firms can profit. Our RDD framework will identify the effect of 
connection on stock prices, but it comes as a result of homophily via shared policy interests, not 
from the social network channel. For a concrete example, suppose that a politician and a director 
are both ardent students of military studies, and graduate from a university with strength in that 
discipline. The election of the politician then has the potential to affect the director’s firm’s value 
through new defense policies, rather than through the social network.  
                                                 
8  The standard error of this estimate is calculated as the standard error of the difference of two 
independent variables, ܨ෠ାሺ50%ሻ and ܨ෠ାሺ50%ሻ, as the two subsamples are completely separate from one another. 
The standard errors for ܨ෠ାሺ50%ሻ and ܨ෠ି ሺ50%ሻ come from nonparametric regressions. 
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We address this issue with an extensive set of interacted fixed effects to address this issue. 
First, we use a set of interactions between school fixed effects ߜ௦, fixed effects of the number of 
decades since graduation ߠ௜௧ and a dummy ܹ݄݅݊ܵܿ݋݋݈௦௧ equal to one if school s is the alma 
mater of any winner in the corresponding election, zero otherwise. This specification controls 
for a school’s specific interests passing into policies via the election of another politician 
graduating from the same school. The additional identification provided by ܹ݄݅݊ܵܿ݋݋݈௦௧ comes 
from the comparison of former classmates with alumni. The flexibility in ߜ௦  allows different 
levels of homophily for different schools, and that of ߠ௜௧  allows for time-varying homophily 
effect over different decades. With ߠ௜௧, we compare different years within a decade; as we cannot 
use year fixed effects in this interaction.9 
Second, we use a set of interactions between industry fixed effects ߯௝  and a dummy 
ܹ݅݊ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝௧ equal to one there is any winning politician in an election connected to a firm in 
that industry, zero otherwise. This specification controls for an industry’s receiving certain 
specific favorable policies thanks to connected winners different from the firm’s own connected 
politician. The identification provided by ܹ݅݊ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝௧ comes from the comparison among 
firms within an industry connected to some winner(s). The flexibility in ߯௝  allows different 
effects on policies for different industries. Furthermore, one may speculate that even within the 
same industry, large and small firms may benefit differently from enacted favorable policies. To 
control for that, we further interact with fixed effects of the quintiles of firm size. Finally, we 
combine both types of controls into a single specification.  
In summary, our research design identifies and consistently estimates the WATE of 
being connected to a candidate in a gubernatorial election, where the effect is averaged with 
weights over the sample of all politicians who stand a chance of experiencing a close election, 
and all firms in the Compustat database. 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION 
We construct our sample using data from several sources. First, we collect the 
gubernatorial election results from the Federal Election Committee (FEC) website. For each 
                                                 
9 We can even strengthen this specification by replacing ܹ݄݅݊ܵܿ݋݋݈௦௧ with an election year fixed effect ߛ௧ 
in those interactions. The interactions ߜ௦ߛ௧ absorb ߜ௦ܹ݄݅݊ܵܿ݋݋݈௦௧, and allow for different homophily effects based 
on, say, the number of alumni winning in that election. We choose to leave these specifications out for simplicity. 
All results remain very similar, and available upon request. 
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election, we identify the candidates finishing first (the winner) and second (the loser) and 
calculate the margin of votes between them. A close election is specified by a margin of votes of 
less than 5%.  
Panel A of Table 1 reports the time series of close gubernatorial elections. The average 
annual number of gubernatorial elections is 13.08 (with a maximum of 37 and minimum of 2). 
The average annual number of close gubernatorial elections is 2.92 (with a maximum of 11 and 
minimum of 0). Out of 157 gubernatorial elections in the U.S. between 1999 and 2010, we 
identify 35 close ones. No trend appears in the relationship between the number of elections and 
the number of close elections. The average vote margin across all close elections is 2.70%.  
Panel B of Table 1 reports characteristics of our sample of connected firms and 
compares them to firms in the Compustat universe in the same period. Our sample includes 63 
firms per year on average, with a maximum of 263 firms, and a minimum of 1 firm, and 
represents 1.01% of the total number of listed firms and 2.15% of the total market capitalization 
in the Compustat dataset. The sample firm’s average market capitalization is $2.98 billion and the 
median is $0.52 billion, which are fairly comparable to average Compustat firms ($2.41 billion 
and $0.25 billion, respectively). Our average firm has a market-to-book ratio of 3.95 (Tobin’s Q 
of 2.03) and age of 9.90 years, as compared to a market-to-book ratio of 4.79 (Tobin’s Q of 2.28) 
and age of 8.32 years for an average Compustat firm. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
We hand-collect the biographical record of these elections using Marquis Who’s Who 
biographies, which contain active and inactive biographies from the Who’s Who publications. Our 
scope of search includes biographies in (i) Who’s Who in American Politics, (ii) World Almanac of 
U.S. Politics, and (iii) The Almanac of American Politics. For each candidate, Who’s Who biographies 
provide a brief vita, including the candidate’s employment history, all undergraduate and 
graduate degrees attained, the year in which those degrees were awarded, and the awarding 
institution. Most of the biographies for our sample are available in Who’s Who. To complete our 
biographies, we use politicians’ archived websites, and other sources on the World Wide Web. 
We retain entries for which we can positively identify the politician.  
Next, we obtain biographical information and past education history for directors and 
senior company officers from BoardEx of Management Diagnostics Limited. The data details 
the relational links among board directors and senior company officers for both active and 
inactive firms by cross-referencing these directors’ and officers’ employment histories, 
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educational backgrounds, and professional qualifications. In particular, the data contain current 
and past roles of each official in a company, with start and end date (year), all undergraduate and 
graduate degrees attained, the year in which those degrees were awarded, and the awarding 
institution. We restrict our sample to board directors in U.S. publicly listed firms. 
We construct our social network measure through educational institutions. We define a 
political connection as a link between a firm’s director and an election candidate who both 
graduate from the same university program within a year. We thereby match institutions and 
degrees on Who’s Who biographies and BoardEx. Following Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008), 
we group the degrees into six categories: (i) business school (Master of Business Administration), 
(ii) medical school, (iii) general graduate (Master of Arts or Master of Science), (iv) Doctor of 
Philosophy, (v) law school, and (vi) general undergraduate. To identify a politician’s alumni 
network, we relax the restriction on year of graduation. Finally, we match our data to stock 
return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
Panel C of Table 1 reports the distribution of common educational backgrounds of 
corporate directors and gubernatorial candidates in our sample. Degrees for undergraduate 
studies seem to be the most important to the connection of directors and politicians: 69.12% of 
politicians and 86.94% of directors are connected through their undergraduate studies, having 
graduated from the same school/university within one year. The figures are 16.18% and 4.81% 
for law school; 5.88% and 6.02% for business school. Doctoral degrees appear to be insignificant 
in connecting politicians to directors. Only 2.94% of politicians and 1.37% of directors are 
connected through Ph.D. programs. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, we report main empirical results from our RDD framework as well as the 
results of the impact of political connections on firm value across many sub-samples. 
4.1 POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND FIRM VALUE IN A REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY DESIGN  
Table 2 presents our estimation of the impact of political connection on firm value by 
relating stock price cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) of connected firms around the election 
day to the winning status of the connected politician. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to 
a candidate in a close gubernatorial election, both of whom graduate from the same university 
program within a year (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008). We calculate CAR for every 
connected firm during a standard 3-day event period, from day -1 to day +1. The event day (day 
0) is the election day reported by the Federal Election Commission, which is always a trading 
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day. We first follow a conventional event study method to calculate the CARs resulting from 
close elections by assuming a single-factor model with the beta estimated from the pre-event 
window, and later use other methods of CAR estimation as robustness checks. Average 
abnormal returns are estimated based on the market model around the election day (Day 0). The 
market model is estimated using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315, ‐61) window. We exploit the 
RDD of close elections in which the winning margin is within a 5% vote share. We control for 
the vote shares separately for winners and losers, as suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010) and 
specified in equation (1) in Section 2 above, to obtain the effect at the exact threshold of 50%. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Results from Table 2 show an overall average significant and positive effect of 
connection to a close election’s winner on firm value. Controlling for state and year fixed effects, 
column 1 reports that firms connected to the winners exhibit CARs which are 3.89% higher than 
CARs of firms connected to the losers at the 5% winning margin. The estimate coefficient is 
statistically significant at 1%. Political connections are thus highly valuable for firms at the state 
level. Column 1’s regression will be used as our benchmark regression throughout the paper.    
In regressions reported in columns 2 to 5, apart from state and year fixed effects, we 
control for industry fixed effects, politicians’ characteristics (age, gender, election turnout of the 
politician, party’s affiliation), directors’ characteristics (age, gender)), and firm characteristics 
(logarithm of market capitalization, Tobin's Q, return on asset, and leverage), respectively. We 
obtain positive coefficient estimates of 4.19%, 2.18%, 4.20%, and 3.56%, significant at 1% or 5%, 
which, except for the result from column 3, are of comparable magnitude and statistical 
significance to our benchmark estimate in column 1. 
While the quality and the timing of pre-election polls are the subject of long-lived debates 
in political science,10 if polls contain additional relevant information, then including them should 
improve the precision of our results. Column 6 repeats our main regression, as in column 1, 
controlling for poll predictions in all elections. We obtain a coefficient of 3.73%, significant at 
1%, on the Winner dummy, which is comparable to the estimate of 3.89% in column 1. Thus, the 
inclusion of poll predictions does not seem to affect our RDD results. 
The large variation in the cross-sectional distribution of CARs might introduce outlier-
biases to our results. As a check, we exclude all CARs exceeding 10% in absolute value from our 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Enns and Richman (2013) on the variability of election polls. 
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sample. As the results in column 7 show, we obtain an estimate of 2.74%, significant at 1%, 
which is smaller than the estimate of 3.89% in column 1. The outliers thus wield influence on, 
but do not significantly change our results.  
It is worth noting that regressions in columns 2 to 7 of Panel A, with the exception of 
column 3, generate comparable results to those in column 1 after controlling for state, election, 
and industry fixed effects and various factors. This similarity in the magnitude of estimates is 
expected from the RDD framework in which the main estimate should not be affected by 
“irrelevant covariates,” and RDD can account for all observable and unobservable characteristics. 
Indeed, when the treatment is comparable to a randomized experiment, any pre-treatment 
control variable must be independent of the treatment, thus its inclusion should not significantly 
alter the estimated magnitude of the treatment effect. Therefore, observed and unobservable 
characteristics of the election year, the industry and the firm are irrelevant covariates and do not 
alter much our main estimate. 
Regressions in columns 1 to 7 show the difference in CARs between firms connected to 
winners and firms connected to losers. To examine the CARs of these firms separately, we ran 
separate regressions of CARs on subsamples of firms connected to the winners and of firms 
connected to the losers against the respective vote shares of the winners and losers. Columns 8 
and 9 of Table 2 report the regression intercepts of +1.14% and -1.27%, both significant at 5%. 
This result shows that firms connected to the winners in close gubernatorial elections experience 
significant positive gain in value (+1.14%), while firms connected to the losers experience 
significant loss of value (-1.27%).        
In summary, Table 2 provides evidence that firms connected to the winner in a close 
gubernatorial election between 1999 and 2010, as compared to firms connected to the loser, 
experience significant gain in firm value. Our RDD results are robust and consistent when we 
control for politician, director, and firm characteristics; year, state, and industry effects; and poll 
prediction margin. Our estimated average CAR of 3.89% for our sample of U.S. firms appears to 
be higher in magnitude than that found by Faccio (2006), who reports an average CAR of 1.43% 
from a cross-country sample of firms experiencing an event of new political connections. 
Meanwhile, our estimate is significantly smaller in magnitude than the estimate from Goldman, 
Rocholl, and So (2009), who report a difference in CARs of 8.97% between Republican-
connected and Democrat-connected firms following the 2000 U.S. presidential election. 
4.2 CANDIDATE CHARACTERISTICS AND THE VALUE OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS   
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The previous section provides evidence of an overall positive impact of network-based 
political connections on firm value at the state level. In the following sections, we investigate if 
this effect varies on various subsamples along the lines of candidate, state, firm, and network 
characteristics. We run the benchmark regression as in column 1 of Table 2 for each of the 
subsamples and compare the estimates.  
Prior literature in political science, economics, and finance has extensively studied 
whether and how politicians’ characteristics such as incumbency and experience (i.e., Lee 2008, 
Caughey and Sekhon 2011) provide them with advantages to win elections. We thus conjecture 
that candidate characteristics determine the value of political connections. We test this conjecture 
by dividing our samples into subsamples of firms, depending on characteristics of politicians. 
Table 3 summarizes our results.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
We first explore whether a candidate’s position as incumbent or challenger in a close 
election and her prior political experience affect our results by partitioning the sample 
accordingly. Regressions in columns 1 and 2 show that firms connected to the winner experience 
significant gain of value, independently of whether the winner is a challenger or an incumbent. 
Political connections are thus generally valuable. However, the effect appears larger for 
challengers (4.91%) than for incumbents (2.25%). The difference in coefficient estimates is 
significant at the 5% level. In column 3, we run a regression on a sub-sample of firms connected 
to the two candidates in a close election who are both challengers (the incumbent might have 
retired or moved to another office), we find an estimate coefficient of 4.91%, significant at 1%. 
This indicates that, in close elections that involve two new candidates, firms connected to the 
winning challenger experience an increase in firm value of 4.91% in comparison to firms 
connected to the losing challenger. Connections to the winning challengers are more valuable 
than to the winning incumbents, and connections to winning challengers in challenger-only close 
elections are even more valuable for firms.             
Challengers with or without political and professional experience at the federal level 
might contribute differently to firm value. We collect information on the positions that 
candidates have held up to election and classify two categories of challengers: those whose main 
occupation in the election year was in a public office at federal level, and those whose main 
occupation was not. Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 report the benchmark estimates by the 
corresponding subsamples that distinguish between firms connected to challengers coming from 
positions at the federal level (for instance, in a senator’s office) and others. We find positive 
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estimates of 1.03% and 4.93%, both significant at 1%, respectively. The difference in coefficient 
estimates is significant at the one percent level. The results indicate that the magnitude of the 
value of political connections is higher for challengers who were not holding federal office and 
who are mainly from local politics.  
In summary, Table 3 shows that our finding—that connections to the winning politician 
in a close election induce a significant gain in firm value—appears to be consistent and robust 
across several subsamples of firms connected to candidates with different characteristics. While 
the impact of political connections on firm value is generally positive and significant, the 
magnitude seems to be larger for firms connected to challenger candidates in comparison to 
firms connected to incumbents, for firms connected to winning challengers in challenger-only 
close elections, and for firms connected to challengers without federal work experience.  
4.3 STATE CORRUPTION AND THE VALUE OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS  
The prior literature suggests that state characteristics impact the value of political 
connections at the state level through local regulation and corruption. For example, Glaeser and 
Saks (2006) show that the level of corruption varies across the states in the U.S. Providing 
evidence on the importance of state politics, Eggers and Hainmueller (2013) report that 
congressmen do not enjoy informational advantage for their own portfolio trade at the federal 
level, but rather at the local level. They disproportionately invest in local firms and in local firms 
that contribute to their campaign. States with better checks and balances should thus be 
associated with lower value of political connections. We test this conjecture and report results in 
Table 4. To allow state-level institutional quality to vary, regressions in Table 4 include only year 
fixed effects, not state fixed effects.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
While the RDD correctly identifies the value of political connections, ascertaining that 
the variation in this value across states is caused by the differences in institutional quality is more 
difficult. Even when we avoid direct reverse causation by using some measures calculated before 
2000, the results are still exposed to endogenous selection by unobservables, such as historical or 
cultural factors, that may affect both institution quality and the value of political connections 
across states. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, we control for this problem by using respectively 
subsamples of firms above and below the median of the ALD (Average Logarithm of Distance 
to capital city) 1970 score of the isolation of the state capital, computed from the 1970 census. 
As reported by Campante and Do (2014), this measure is strongly predictive of state-level 
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corruption across American states (high ALD score indicates more isolated state capital, which 
implies lower media coverage of state politics and, therefore, more corruption). This measure is 
highly persistent over time and, arguably, not directly affected by unobservable determinants of 
corruption. Results from columns 1 and 2 support our conjecture. The estimated effect is 
positive (4.66%) and statistically significant at 1% among states with higher-than-median 
isolation of the capital city, and is positive and insignificant for other states. The difference in 
coefficient estimates is significant at 5%. Political connections are thus significantly more 
valuable in a more severely corrupt state. 
Columns 3 and 4 report results on an alternative measure of corruption which was also 
used by Campante and Do (2014). We use the dataset of all newspapers gathered in 
Newslibrary.com to search for the word “corruption” close to the state name, as is similar in 
method to Saiz and Simonsohn (2013). We find that the value of political connections is positive 
and significant in more corrupt states, which are defined as the ones with higher frequency of the 
use of the word “corruption” in local newspapers, while this value is non-significant in less 
corrupt ones. The estimate on more corrupt states is 2.90%. The difference in coefficient 
estimates is significant at 10%.    
Columns 5 and 6 divide states by the most commonly used measure of state-level 
corruption constructed by Glaeser and Saks (2006), who extract actual conviction data from the 
Department of Justice’s “Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public 
Integrity Section” to form a measure of convicted corruption cases, averaged from 1976 to 2002 
to remove periodical noises. Results also support our intuition: political connections are more 
valuable in more corrupt states than in less corrupt states. The effect is clearly stronger in 
magnitude and statistically significant (4.07%, significant at 1%) in more corrupt states, and 
positive but insignificant in less corrupt states. The difference in coefficient estimates is highly 
significant at the 1% level.    
In sum, Table 4 provides strong and consistent evidence that the value of political 
connections varies as a function of state corruption. The estimated value of political connection 
is larger in more corrupt states.  
4.4 FIRM CHARACTERISTICS AND THE VALUE OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS  
Prior literature has explored extensively how politics and political connections impact 
corporations. For example, Khwaja and Mian (2005) study how political connections impact 
corporate access to finance; Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) show that politically 
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connected firms are more likely to receive financial bailout; and more recently, Cohen, Coval, 
and Malloy (2011) show that changes in important congressional committee chairmanships 
reduce investments of firms in the states of the congressmen. Following the literature, we study 
firm characteristics as potential determinants of the value of political connections, and detail 
results in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
We first run our standard regression on two subsamples of firms whose market 
capitalization is respectively above or below the median in our sample. Results reported in 
columns 1 and 2 show coefficient estimates of 5.58%, significant at 1%, and of 1.33%, 
insignificant, for small and large firms, respectively. The difference in these two coefficient 
estimates is significant at the ten percent level. Politically connected firms that are smaller thus 
experience significantly greater gain of value in comparison to larger firms. Put differently, 
political connections are more important for small firms. Larger firms may be connected to 
many politicians, and the financial benefit of connection to one more politician may only 
represent a small fraction of the firm’s value; hence, for larger firms, the effect should be smaller.  
An important potential benefit of political connections is easier access to finance, as 
shown by Khwaja and Mian (2005). We test this conjecture by investigating whether the value of 
political connection is associated with a firm’s dependence on external finance. We construct 
Rajan and Zingales’s (1998) measure of dependence on external finance as the industry average 
of (CapEx – Cashflow from Operations)/CapEx, using Fama-French 48-industry classification, 
then divide our sample into subsamples with above and below industry median scores. Columns 
3 and 4 of Table 5 report our standard regression results on these two sub-samples. Connected 
firms relying more on external finance exhibit a coefficient on the Winner dummy of 5.33% and 
are significant at 1%; in contrast, for connected firms that are less dependent on external finance, 
the estimated effect is positive but insignificant at conventional levels. The difference in these 
two coefficient estimates is significant at the five percent level. Thus, firms that are financially 
independent seem not to be affected after election results. Meanwhile, the value of political 
connections is greater for financially dependent firms. 
Our results show that social-network based political connections significantly enhance a 
firm’s market value. One might ask whether investors and markets are aware of these 
connections. We note that our framework does not require that all investors know about the 
connections. Reactions from a limited number of informed investors may suffice to drive our 
results. In search of further evidence of the interest from investors on close elections, we divide 
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our sample into two subsamples of firms with below and above median abnormal trading 
activities around the election day, following Campbell and Wasley’s (1996) approach, and re-run 
our benchmark regression. Results are reported in columns 5 and 6 of Table 5. In terms of CARs, 
among firms with a high level of abnormal trading activities, the ones connected to winners 
outperform the ones connected to losers by 5.51% surrounding the election window. The impact 
is insignificant among firms with a low level of abnormal trading activities. The difference in the 
two coefficient estimates among the two groups of firms is significant at the five percent level, 
indicating that at least a number of investors follow up with the election, react, and trade on the 
election results.         
In summary, the examination of firm characteristics, as shown in Table 5, provides 
further evidence that certain firms benefit from political connections more than others.  
4.5 NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS AND THE VALUE OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS  
The main objective of our paper is to identify the value of political connections through 
the networks of politicians and directors. We construct our proxies for social connections based 
on the educational ties. A growing literature in finance shows that social networks impact various 
financial decisions such as investment decisions and returns (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008), 
venture capital funds’ investment performance and competition (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu 
2007, 2010), firm policies (Fracassi 2009, Shue 2013), firm financing (Engelberg, Gao, and 
Parsons 2012), board effectiveness (Nguyen 2012), and entrepreneurship activities (Lerner and 
Malmendier 2013). We thus investigate the impact of network characteristics such as distance 
(strength), size, and recent network interactions, and report results in Table 6.  
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
The strength of social networks is defined by how close the distance is between 
members. Our definition of the connection between directors and politicians based on 
educational backgrounds is stringent. We require directors and politicians to have graduated 
from the same school on the same university campus and within a year of difference. If network 
strength matters, we should observe that the value of political connections will be reduced when 
the connection is less close, i.e., when we loosen our definition of political connections. We note 
that when the definition of connection is loosened, the sample size is increasing as the networks 
include more members.  
Columns 1 to 8 in Panel A of Table 6 report results of our benchmark regression on 
subsamples of alumni who graduate from the same university program in the same year, and 
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within one to five years, ten years, and twenty years of difference. Column 1 shows the strongest 
impact of social networks when the networks are the closest, having directors and politicians 
who graduate from the same school, at the same university campus, and in the same year. The 
coefficient estimate on the Winner dummy is 6.30%, significant at the one percent level. When 
we require that directors and politicians graduate from the same school, at the same university 
campus, but within one year of difference, as in our benchmark regression, we have a smaller 
coefficient estimate of 3.89%, significant at the one percent level. In column 3, when we require 
that directors and politicians graduate from the same school, at the same university campus, but 
within two years of difference, the coefficient estimate on the Winner dummy is further reduced 
to 1.97%, still significant at 5%. In columns 4 to 8, as expected, the coefficient estimates on the 
Winner dummy become insignificant when networks are extended to less close alumni networks.   
To investigate the impact of network size on the value of networks, we sort the 
educational institutions by the number of observations in the sample, enabling us to look at the 
number of prominent graduates who rise to the top in business and politics, and not just at any 
graduate from the same year. Intuitively, when a network is better represented in the sample, its 
links are arguably stronger in Granovetter’s (1974) sense, in that each pair shares more common 
connections. Such a network has a higher measure of network closure, according to Karlan et al. 
(2009), and is more conducive to agreements that require commitments between pairs in the 
network. In contrast, Karlan et al. (2009) show that a low closure network provides better 
incentives for information sharing.  
In the context of the U.S., Ivy League universities dominate networks in our sample, 
providing more directors and politicians than any other universities. They are thus big networks. 
Columns 1 and 2 in Panel B of Table 6 report the coefficient estimates of 0.54%, significant at 
1%, and of 4.43%, significant at 5%, on subsamples of Ivy League and non-Ivy League 
connected firms, respectively. The difference in coefficient estimates is significant at 5%. 
Political connections thus appear to be more valuable among firms in non-Ivy League (small) 
networks than in Ivy League (big) networks.  
Columns 3 and 4 in Panel B of Table 6 report estimates of 2.14% and 4.43%, significant 
at 1% and 5%, for subsamples of connections that are above (large network) and below (small 
network) the median number of observations, respectively. However, the difference is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. The finding that small network links are more 
valuable, according to Karlan et al.’s (2009) theory, implies that the links bring value by providing 
trust and commitment in profitable agreements, rather than just sharing information.  
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Network ongoing and recent interactions have been reported to impact network value. 
Shue (2013) shows that social networks impact firm policies and that the impact is significantly 
stronger after alumni reunions. We empirically test this idea by running our benchmark 
regression on subsamples of firms with directors and connected politicians whose last alumni 
reunions were held in the election year and were not held in the election year. Results from 
columns 5 and 6 show that the value of political connections is much higher when an alumni 
reunion falls in the year of an election. The coefficient estimates are 3.49% and 0.91%, both 
significant at 1%, respectively for the two subsamples. The difference in coefficient estimates is 
significant at 1%. 
In summary, results from Table 6 show that network characteristics such as distance 
(strength), size, and recent interactions impact the value of political connections. Political 
connections are more valuable when the networks are closer, stronger, smaller, and active.   
5. CHANNELS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RESULTS  
Our paper attempts to identify the value of political connections, to study their potential 
determinants, and to investigate whether political connections change firm behavior. While we 
cannot provide an exhaustive list of potential channels that explain the value of political 
connections, we will discuss a few prominent channels suggested by the literature and provide 
further evidence relating to firm operation and headquarters location, corporate investment 
decisions, and government procurement contracts.  
5.1 THE VALUE OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS: POTENTIAL CHANNELS OF INFLUENCE 
 The prior literature provides several channels and mechanisms that make political 
connections valuable to firms, with each paper focusing on one specific channel. For example, 
Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) provide evidence that politically connected firms obtain 
preferential financing in that they are more likely to receive financial bailouts. A low or free cost 
of financing will certainly reduce a firm’s cost of capital and thus increase firm value. Goldman, 
Rocholl, and So (2013) show that S&P500 firms that are politically connected to the winning 
party in a House, Senate, or presidential election are more likely to experience an increase in 
government procurement contracts.  
We have indirectly investigated several channels that might explain our finding of the 
significant and positive value of political connections. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 show that the 
value of political connections is greater for firms more dependent on external financing 
(leverage). As is consistent with evidence from the literature, political connections facilitate 
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corporate financing and increase firm value (e.g., Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell 2006; Fan, 
Wong, and Zhang 2007).  
State-level corruption seems to be another major channel. Columns 1 to 6 of Table 4 
show that, using different proxies for corruption, the value of connections is positively related to 
the level of state corruption. This evidence is consistent with the widely held view in political 
science that state politics in the U.S. is more corrupt, thus more valuable to connected firms at 
the state level than at the federal level (e.g. Glaeser and Saks 2006, Eggers and Hainmueller 2013, 
and Campante and Do 2014). Our result hints that political connections might also create value 
to connected firms through corrupt means. Local politicians might have more leeway, for 
example, in handing local contracts to connected firms. 
From a social network perspective, political connections might be valuable because of 
the trust-building and information-sharing roles of networks. This potential channel is 
corroborated by findings in columns 1 to 8 in Panel A, and in columns 1 and 2 in Panel B of 
Table 6, that stronger and closer (smaller) networks beget higher value. These results can be 
interpreted by Karlan et al.’s (2009) theory that the connections bring value in fostering trust and 
commitment in profitable deals, rather than simply sharing information. 
Another potential channel is through trading activities. Columns 5 and 6 from Table 5 
show that among connected firms that experience abnormal trading activities surrounding close 
elections, firms connected to the winner are associated with significantly higher CARs in 
comparison to firms connected to the loser. This indicates that a number of investors do pay 
attention to the election outcomes and trade on connected firms.                     
5.2 FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF THE CHANNELS: CORPORATE OPERATIONS AND 
HEADQUARTERS IN THE ELECTION STATE 
One might still be skeptical about why stock prices of a connected firm in one state are 
affected by the election outcome of a connected politician in another, faraway state. Why should 
these politicians care about currying favors to firms that operate outside their states?  
The most direct way to address this relevant question is to look at each connected firm’s 
operations, measured for instance by sales or employment, in the state of the connected 
politician. Unfortunately these detailed corporate operations by state are not readily available. We 
surmount this difficulty by providing a new measure of firm activities by state and year. We 
follow Saiz and Simonsohn (2013) and Campante and Do (2014) by searching each company’s 
name through all local newspapers in the connected politician’s state within each year, using 
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Newslibrary.com, and normalize the number of search hits on firms by the search hits for the 
neutral keyword “September.” The resulting hit rate is used as a proxy of a firm’s activities 
within a state one year before an election. We run our benchmark RDD regression as in column 
1 of Table 2 on the subsample of connected firms that exhibit some state-level activities, i.e., 
when the hit rate is positive. Results are reported in column 1 of Table 7. We find that, among 
firms having some state-level activities prior to the election, firms connected to the winner in a 
close gubernatorial election enjoy positive and significant stock price reaction over firms 
connected to the loser. The coefficient estimates of the Winner dummy are 3.33%, significant at 
1%.11 Political connections are thus valuable for connected firms having activities in the election 
states (measured by the volume of hits in the news in the connected politician’s state). 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
In a recent paper, Garcia and Norli (2012) propose another proxy for state-level 
corporate activities. Their measure is the number of times that a state’s name is cited in the 
SEC’s 10-K forms. As they show, this proxy is robust in predicting that investment in truly local 
companies outperforms investment in less local firms. Using Garcia and Norli (2012) data, we 
construct our state presence indicator that marks all firm-state pairs where the firm has reported 
that state in its 10-K forms. We then augment our measure with OneSource data, from which we 
could identify the economic group of each firm and the state to which the entities in the firm's 
economic group reside. We run our benchmark regressions on the subsample of firms which 
have some presence in the election states (i.e., firms with a state presence indicator equal to one). 
As reported in column 2 of Table 7, we find a coefficient estimate of 4.70%, significant at 10%. 
This result indicates that among firms that have operations in the election states, the value of 
political connections is significantly larger for firms that are connected to the winner. 
All else being equal, we expect that connected firms that are headquartered in the 
election states should be more directly impacted by the election outcome. We thus run our 
benchmark regression on a subsample of connected firms that are headquartered in the election 
states. Since Heider and Ljungqvist (2014) find that Compustat created data bias when backfilling 
firm headquarters states to actual historic headquarters states for the 1989-2011 period, we use 
their method to correct for Compustat’s states of firm headquarters in our sample. Moreover, we 
also manually search for 8 firms whose information on headquarters is missing from Compustat. 
                                                 
11 In robustness checks that produce consistent (not reported) results, we refine this proxy by excluding 
common corporate names such as Apple and normalize by the number of citations in the New York Times. 
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We therefore obtain complete information on headquarters for all connected firms in our sample. 
Column 3 of Table 7 reports our result. The estimated coefficient of the Winner dummy is 2.81%, 
highly significant at the one percent level. Among firms that have headquarters in the election 
states, the value of firms connected to the winner in a close gubernatorial election significantly 
increases post-election, in comparison to firms connected to the loser. We however caution 
against strong interpretations of this result because the subsample of connected firms 
headquartered in the election states includes only 30 observations, and because corporate 
headquarters may not always be the place where firms conduct most of their activities. 
In sum, results from Table 7 strengthen our findings from Tables 2 to 6 that political 
connections significantly increase firm value. Our novel measure of search hits on local 
newspapers and Garcia and Norli’s (2012) state presence measure appear to be robust proxies 
for corporate operations across states. 
5.3 POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND CORPORATE OUTCOMES  
A potential alternative channel that explains the value of political connections relates to 
the conduct of business: political connections assist connected firms, for example, in facilitating 
large investments (perhaps through outright financial help or cheap financing) or in obtaining 
more and larger state and federal procurement contracts. Although we cannot comprehensively 
provide evidence on every aspect of connected firms, we test this conjecture on a few important 
observables such as investment and state and federal procurement contracts.  
We use annual growth in corporate investments as the dependent variable in our 
benchmark RDD specification instead of CARs. Corporate investments in a given year are 
measured as the sum of a firm's capital expenditure and research and development expenditure 
normalized by start-of-the-year total assets. Change in corporate investment in year N is defined 
as the difference in logarithm of corporate investment in year N versus year N-1.      
Panel A of Table 8 shows the results with windows from one year before to three years 
after the election year. Columns 1 and 2 report that in the year before and in the election year, 
firms connected to winners show no difference in terms of investments, compared with firms 
connected to losers. This finding reaffirms the random assignment in our RD design. 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
One year after the election, as column 3 shows, no significant change in corporate 
investments exists. Column 4 shows that two years after the election, firms connected to the 
winners invest 40.70% more than do firms connected to the losers. The effect is significant at 
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5%. Three years after the election, as column 5 shows, the effect remains positive, but 
insignificant. This finding of the positive impact of political connections on corporate 
investment is consistent with Cohen, Coval, and Malloy (2011), who show that powerful 
politicians create shocks in states’ public expenditures which impacts state-level corporate capital 
spending.  
We next investigate another potentially important channel of political influence, that is, 
whether connected firms are favored to win government’s contracts.12 We obtain connected 
firms’ state-level procurement data from the Federal Procurement Data System. We use proxies 
for changes in state and federal procurements as the dependent variable in our benchmark RDD 
specification instead of CARs. Columns 1 and 2 in Panel B of Table 8 show results using 2-year 
before against 2-year after change in the logarithm of the dollar value of connected firms’ state 
and federal procurement contracts and assistance, respectively. The coefficient estimate on the 
Winner dummy in column 1 is 1.86, significant at 1%. This indicates that, in comparison to firms 
connected to the loser, firms connected to the winner in a close gubernatorial election 
experience an increase of 186% in the logarithm of the dollar value of the state procurement 
contracts in the period of two years after election relative to the period of two years before 
election. However, one should caution against the small sample size of firms with state-level 
contracts and assistance in column 1, as the result might be sensitive to a few very large contracts. 
By contrast, we do not find any significant difference in the value of federal procurement 
contracts between firms connected to losers and firms connected to winners. The estimate in 
column 2 is statistically insignificant, with large standard errors despite a more sizeable sample.  
      Columns 3 to 4 report the effects of connections on a firm’s likelihood to receive 
procurement contracts in the period after the election for the subsamples of firms headquartered 
in the election states and for other firms, respectively. Column 4 shows that, among firms 
headquartered in the election states, it is significantly more likely for firms connected to the 
winner to obtain state procurement contracts after the election. Meanwhile, among firms not 
headquartered in the election states, the effect is not significant. The difference in coefficient 
estimates between columns 3 and 4 is statistically insignificant.      
                                                 
12 Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2013) document that S&P500 firms connected to the winning party in 
certain House, Senate, or presidential elections are likely to receive more government procurement contracts. 
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In sum, results from Table 8 provide further evidence that political connections affect 
corporate investing activities. Connected firms to the winners are also more likely to obtain state 
procurement contracts, and if they do, they enjoy much bigger contracts.  
6. NETWORK HOMOPHILY, FALSIFICATION TESTS, AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
In this section, we investigate whether network homophily impacts our results; conduct 
various robustness checks, including nonparametric and placebo tests; and perform sensitivity 
checks that are testable in the RDD framework.  
6.1 NETWORK HOMOPHILY 
Our empirical tests show a significant and positive impact of political connections on 
firm value. However, as with any study on social networks, network homophily remains a 
potential confounding factor. In our context, a homophily bias may arise from the possibility 
that politicians and directors sharing the same characteristics are more likely to join the same 
school, and later respectively enact and benefit from similar policies, thus confounding the effect 
of connections through education links with the effect of shared characteristics. 
As detailed in section 2.2, we use an extensive set of interactions of fixed effects to 
control for potential homophily bias. On top of identification by RDD, the additional 
identification comes from both (i) comparison between former classmates and alumni, allowing 
for flexible homophily effects across different schools and over time, and (ii) comparison 
between firms in the same winning industry, allowing for flexible homophily effects across 
different industries. We detail our results in Table 9.   
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
Column 1 reports the result from our first additional identification strategy that controls 
for favorable policies coming from other winners from the same school. We find a coefficient 
estimate of 2.64%, significant at 1%, on the Winner dummy. Column 2 shows the result from the 
second additional strategy that controls for favorable policies enacted for the same connected 
industry. The coefficient estimate on the Winner dummy is 4.10%, significant at 5%. When we 
further interact this set of controls with a set of fixed effects for quintiles of firm size, the 
estimate becomes 3.19%, significant at 1%, as reported in column 3. Finally, column 4 reports 
the specification that combines both strategies. The estimate is 2.53%, significant at 5%. 
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The estimates in Table 9 are all positive and strongly significant, and not substantially 
smaller than the benchmark results shown in Table 2. This similarity indicates reassuringly that 
our analysis and conclusions are robust to concerns of potential network homophily bias.  
6.2 NONPARAMETRIC AND PLACEBO TESTS 
We first perform the nonparametric tests specified in Section 2, and report the result in 
column 1 of Panel A in Table 10. The estimated effect is 2.27%, significant at 5%.13 
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
Our RDD relies on the vote share threshold of 50%. Lee and Lemieux (2010) suggest 
that RDD is falsifiable if we use “placebo” thresholds, i.e., those at which no jump in the 
treatment exists. In columns 2 to 5, we apply this falsification test with placebo vote share 
cutoffs different from 50%. For example, in the sample used for column 2, a politician is marked 
as hypothetically elected if his vote share is 48% or above, and marked as hypothetically defeated 
otherwise. We then apply the nonparametric regression around the placebo cutoff of 48% and 
report the corresponding estimate. Because this threshold is only hypothetical, we do not expect 
to find results similar to those in column 1. Columns 2 to 5 confirm our prediction: for the 
placebo thresholds of 48%, 49%, 51%, and 52%, the estimates are small and statistically 
insignificant. It is thus reassuring that hypothetical cutoffs cannot replicate the significant result 
with the real cutoff of 50%, as shown in column 1. 
 Figure 1 visualizes the outcome variable, CAR(-1,+1), against vote shares, plotted in bins 
by vote shares (Lee and Lemieux 2010), and with markers of bins above and below the 50% 
cutoff. We plot nonparametric estimates of CAR(-1,+1) as functions of vote share, where each 
half of the graph represents the estimated function for vote shares greater or less than 50% (i.e., 
for elected or defeated politicians, respectively). The bands represent confidence intervals at 
95%. 
[Insert Figures 1 Here] 
We see a large gap at exactly the 50% threshold. Furthermore, visual evidence of an 
inverted “Z” shape of CAR with respect to vote share can be seen: as vote share increases 
around 50%, and as CAR first decreases, then jumps sharply at the threshold of 50%, and then 
decreases again. According to Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe’s (2012) event-based explanation, this 
                                                 
13 We also rerun all analyses in the paper using the nonparametric approach, which produce very similar 
qualitative conclusions. For simplicity, we choose to present the simpler implementation of RDD.  
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Z shape is predictable in a model where the market internalizes available information before 
election and anticipates the gap at 50% if the prior probabilities of winning or losing are 
markedly different from 50%. 
However, Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe’s Z shape depends on the demanding hypothesis 
that no confounding factors can possibly bias the non-parametric estimation in the whole range 
of vote shares between 48.5% and 52.5%. This hypothesis is not consistent with the further 
increase at around 52% vote share in Figure 1. Such increase is likely due to cross-sectional 
heterogeneities, coming from innate characteristics of elections with results at the level of 52%-
48%. In traditional event studies, such heterogeneities could only be dealt with by controlling for 
observable characteristics. In contrast, RDD identification holds on the cross-section of stocks 
and thus does not require the strong hypothesis of no confounding factors. 
The RDD results can be sensitive to the choice of nonparametric specification, most 
importantly in terms of the bandwidth chosen in the nonparametric regression (Imbens and 
Kalyanaraman 2012). We choose a prudent approach in examining a wide range of bandwidths 
in our nonparametric estimation procedure. The results are shown in Figure 2.  
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
The estimated effect remains stable, and always significant at 5%, across all choices of 
bandwidth. For our benchmark choice of 0.05, the effect is 2.27%. For bandwidths smaller than 
0.05, the estimate becomes noisier but also much stronger. In sum, Figure 2 clearly confirms the 
result that firms make significant gains in value following the elections of their connected 
governors. 
6.3 ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS OF THE EVENT STUDY 
The focus of our analysis is on the three-day event window, from -1 to +1. As this event 
window, specification is simply one among several possibilities; we also consider our main 
specification using two alternative windows (-2 to +2), and (0 to +2). Both cases produce 
sensibly similar results, which are available upon request. 
In our paper, cumulated abnormal returns are estimated based on the one-factor market 
model around the election day (Day 0). The market model is estimated using daily data over a 
255-day (-315,-61) window. As a further check, we calculate the CARs using different methods, 
including the cumulative daily stock (raw) returns, Fama-French’s three-factor model (Fama and 
French 1993), and the four-factor model (Carhart 1997). We then use these CARs in our RDD 
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regressions, as in Table 2. We find estimates mostly similar to those reported in Table 2. Results 
are reported in columns 1 to 6 in Panel B of Table 10. 
Throughout our analysis, we choose to keep the unit of observation at the most 
fundamental level: each observation represents a connection between a firm and a candidate’s 
election. Columns 7 to 9 in Panel B of Table 10 examine other levels of observation, where the 
data are respectively aggregated by politician-year, director-year, and firm-year. Coefficient 
estimates are almost identical to the benchmark results. 
6.4 CHECKS OF RANDOMNESS 
Lee and Lemieux (2010) emphasizes RDD’s advantages in that one can check the near-
randomness of winning or losing a close election by applying the benchmark specification on all 
pre-election variables to verify that they do not exhibit any discontinuity at the threshold. We run 
those regressions on pre-election variables of firm-candidate connections from close U.S. 
gubernatorial elections between 1999 and 2010, and report supporting results in Table 11.  
[Insert Table 11 Here] 
Panel A of Table 11 reports regressions of politicians’ characteristics, such as age, gender, 
logarithm of the vote turnout, incumbency, poll win margin, party affiliation, and federal work 
experience on the Winner dummy. Panel B examines director characteristics such as age, gender, 
and size of director network. Panel C considers state characteristics used in previous tables, such 
as ALD 1970 score (isolation of the state capital, Campante and Do 2014), corruption news (Saiz 
and Simonsohn 2013, Campante and Do 2014), and corruption conviction rate (Glaeser and 
Saks 2006). Panel D exhibits results of different firm characteristics we have used in Tables 1 to 
5, such as firm size, leverage, and Tobin’s Q. Almost none of the reported regressions provides a 
significant coefficient of the Winner dummy, consistent with the assumption that the considered 
variables do not exhibit discontinuities around the vote share threshold.  
In summary, our randomness robustness checks show that our results are found only in 
specifications where the treatment matters, and not in tests with irrelevant event windows or 
irrelevant vote share thresholds. Consequently, political connection must be the causal factor 
behind these results. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Our paper studies the impact of the network of politicians and directors on firm value. 
We use the Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to identify the value of connections to a 
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politician elected to be state’s governor in the U.S. in a closely contested race. The estimate of 
the weighted average treatment effect (WATE) during the period 1999 to 2010 shows an average 
positive and significant cumulative abnormal return of 3.89% surrounding the election date. The 
results are robust to homophily concerns, various parametric and nonparametric specifications, 
to different measures of outcome variables, to different definitions of social network, and across 
many subsamples. 
We also find that political connections are more valuable for firms connected to winning 
challengers and challengers not from federal offices, as well as for firms in more corrupt states, 
firms in states of connected firms’ headquarters and with corporate operations, in smaller firms, 
and in firms dependent on external finance. Political connections are more valuable when the 
network is closer, stronger, smaller, and active. After elections, firms connected to the winners 
receive significantly more state procurement contracts and invest significantly more than do 
firms connected to the losers.  
Our potential contributions to the finance literature are threefold. First, we propose a 
new approach to measure political connections based on social networks of politicians and 
directors of listed firms. This broad and representative measure of political connections results in 
a relatively sizable sample of U.S. firms. Any potential measurement errors represent an 
attenuation bias that reduces the absolute size and statistical significance of the estimate.  
Second, we propose a robust solution to the identification problem. Our framework 
deals adequately with both the endogeneity of the connected politician and the selection bias due 
to network homophily, providing a powerful internal validity of the empirical results. Moreover, 
the estimated effect is a WATE across the sample of all politicians subject to a close election, 
and across sampled firms, which are comparable to Compustat’s universe. Our results are thus 
externally valid and generalizable to the population of all firms and politicians.  
Third, we find a consistent, positive, economically meaningful impact of political 
connections on firm value in the U.S., particularly at the state level. This result complements 
international evidence in extant literature, and enriches evidence from the U.S. that focuses 
mainly on the benefits of political connections to parties and politicians at the federal level.  
Overall, our study identifies the value of social network-based political connections in the 
United States and uncovers its variation across different states, firms, and network characteristics.  
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ECONOMETRIC APPENDIX 
As shown by Lee and Lemieux (2010), suppose that the cumulative abnormal returns 
averaged over firms connected to a candidate i, CARi, is a function of the treatment variable, namely 
win/lose status, all observable characteristics Wi as well as unobservables Ui. The vote share of each 
candidate is also a function of Wi and unobservables Vi (while we assume linearity for simplicity, the 
results are much more general): 
ܥܣܴ௜ ൌ ܹ݅݊݊݁ݎ௜ߚ ൅ܹ	௜ߛ ൅ ௜ܷ,	
ܸ݋ݐ݄݁ܵܽݎ݁௜ ൌ ௜ܹߜ ൅ ௜ܸ. 
Assume that conditional on W and U, the density of V is continuous. This assumption 
amounts to saying that each candidate cannot fully determine the exact vote share (partial influence 
on vote share is still allowed). Therefore, ௏݂௢௧௘ௌ௛௔௥௘|ௐ,௎ሺݔ|ܹ,ܷሻ, the probability density of vote 
share conditional on W and U, is continuous. Then the joint distribution of W and U conditional on 
vote share is also continuous in vote share, as: 
Prሾܹ ൌ ݓ,ܷ ൌ ݑ|ܸ݋ݐ݄݁ܵܽݎ݁ ൌ ݔሿ ൌ ௏݂௢௧௘ௌ௛௔௥௘|ௐ,௎ሺݔ|ܹ,ܷሻ Pr	ሾܹ ൌ ݓ,ܷ ൌ ݑሿ௏݂௢௧௘ௌ௛௔௥௘ሺݔሻ  
Because of this continuity, all observed and unobserved predetermined characteristics will 
have identical distributions on either side of the threshold, ܸ݋ݐ݄݁ܵܽݎ݁ ൌ 50%: 
lim௫↓ହ଴%Prሾܹ ൌ ݓ,ܷ ൌ ݑ|ܸ݋ݐ݄݁ܵܽݎ݁ ൌ ݔሿ ൌ lim௫↑ହ଴%Prሾܹ ൌ ݓ,ܷ ൌ ݑ|ܸ݋ݐ݄݁ܵܽݎ݁ ൌ ݔሿ 
We can thus define and estimate the treatment effect as: 
ߚோ஽஽ ≝ lim௏௢௧௘ௌ௛௔௥௘↓ହ଴% ܧሺܥܣܴ௜|ܹ݅݊ሻ െ lim௏௢௧௘ௌ௛௔௥௘↑ହ଴% ܧሺܥܣܴ௜|ܮ݋ݏ݁ሻ
ൌ ܧሺܥܣܴ௜ሺܹ݅݊ሻ െ ܥܣܴ௜ሺܮ݋ݏ݁ሻ|ܸ݋ݐ݄݁ܵܽݎ݁ ൌ 50%ሻ. 
The effect can be estimated by approximating CARi from both sides of the 50% threshold of 
vote share. This procedure controls for both observable and unobservable characteristics, using the 
observed vote share, not the vote share predicted by polls or markets (the observable part.) 
Moreover, if we let the effect be heterogeneous across observations, i.e., ߚሺ ௜ܹ, ௜ܷሻ with ௜ܹ 
representing all observable and unobservable characteristics of each observation i, then the estimate 
can be rewritten as follows: 
ߚோ஽஽ ൌ නߚሺܹ,ܷሻ ݂
ሺ50%|ܹ,ܷሻ
݂ሺ50%ሻ ݀ܩሺܹ,ܷሻ, 
where ܩሺܹ,ܷሻ  is the cumulative joint distribution of (W,U), and the weight ௙ሺହ଴%|ௐ,௎ሻ௙ሺହ଴%ሻ  
represents the ex-ante likelihood of the characteristics (W,U) to produce a close election. ߚோ஽஽  is 
thus a Weighted Average Treatment Effect across all possible observations. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics of our sample. Panel A shows the details and distribution 
of gubernatorial  and  close gubernatorial  elections  at  5%  vote margin by  election  year. Panel B 
shows  descriptive  statistics  of  politically  connected  firms  in  our  sample  and  of  firms  in  the 
Compustat database. A firm  is defined as politically connected  if one of  its directors and a close 
election’s candidate graduate from the same university program within a year. Market Cap is the 
firm's market capitalization (in millions) measured at the fiscal year end. Common Equity  is the 
firm's book value of equity  (in millions). Market  to Book Ratio  is  the  ratio of  the  firm's market 
value of equity  to book value of equity. Capital Expenditure  is  the  firm's capital expenditure (in 
millions). Age is the firm's age. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Tobin's Q  is the 
ratio  of  the  sum  of  book  value  of  total  assets  and market  value  of  equity  less  book  value  of 
stockholders'  common  equity  to  total  assets.  Payout  is  the  sum  of  dividends  paid  and  shares 
repurchased (in millions). Tangibility  is  the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment  to  total 
assets. ROA  is  the  ratio of operating  income before depreciation  to  start‐of‐period  total  assets. 
RND  is  the  ratio of  research  and development  expenditure  to  start‐of‐period  total  assets. Cash 
Reserve Ratio  is  the  ratio of  the  firm's cash and short‐term  investments  to  total assets. Panel C 
shows the distribution of degrees of connected politicians and directors in our sample. 
Panel A. Distribution of Gubernatorial Elections  
              
Election Year  Number of Elections 
Number of 
Close Elections 
Proportion of Close 
Election 
Average Margin 
of Close Election 
1999  3  1  0.333  0.011 
2000  11  3  0.273  0.026 
2001  2  0  0.000  ‐ 
2002  36  11  0.306  0.280 
2003  3  1  0.333  0.039 
2004  11  4  0.364  0.024 
2005  2  0  0.000  ‐ 
2006  36  3  0.083  0.025 
2007  3  0  0.000  ‐ 
2008  11  1  0.091  0.035 
2009  2  1  0.500  0.038 
2010  37  10  0.270  0.190 
Total  157  35  ‐  ‐ 
              
Mean  13.083  2.917  0.213  0.027 
Median  7  1  0.271  0.026 
Min  2  0  0.000  0.011 
Max  37  11  0.500  0.390 
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Panel B. Firm Characteristics 
                       
Sample     Compustat Universe 
Mean  Median  StD  Mean  Median  StD 
Market Cap (in $million)  2,980.630  515.026  16,433.430    2,411.790  252.717  11,123.870 
Common Equity (in $million)  1,170.820  201.170  4,687.690    1,039.540  120.486  5,554.220 
Market to Book Ratio  3.949  2.186  8.553    4.789  1.958  278.285 
Capital Expenditure (in $million)  113.184  11.171  579.865    147.541  6.655  951.273 
Age  9.902  9.367  6.324    8.316  7.167  6.496 
Leverage   0.260  0.224  0.255    0.274  0.207  0.272 
Tobin's Q  2.029  1.469  1.673    2.279  1.414  3.344 
Payout (in $million)  77.105  1.519  248.871    76.197  0.223  463.509 
Tangibility  0.186  0.106  0.207    0.221  0.129  0.231 
ROA  ‐0.018  0.026  0.226    ‐0.063  0.015  0.483 
RND  0.130  0.061  0.172    0.124  0.068  0.203 
Cash Reserve Ratio  0.273  0.180  0.264    0.245  0.145  0.254 
Number of firms per year  63  24  95    3,002  2,939  476 
 
Panel C. Distribution of Degrees of Connected Politicians and Directors  
        
Degree  Politicians (%)  Directors (%) 
Business School  5.88  6.02 
Graduate  5.88  0.86 
PhD  2.94  1.37 
Law School  16.18  4.81 
Undergraduate  69.12  86.94 
Total (%)  100.00  100.00 
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Table 2: Political Connections and Firm Value in a Regression Discontinuity Design 
This  table  reports  OLS  regressions  of  the  cumulative  abnormal  returns  (CARs)  among  the  politically  connected  firms  around  close 
gubernatorial  elections  in  the U.S. between  1999  and  2010. A  firm  is defined  as politically  connected  if one of  its directors  and  a  close 
election’s candidate graduate  from the same university program within a year. Each observation pairs a connected firm to the connected 
candidate’s close election. Average abnormal returns are estimated based on the market model around the election day (Day 0). The market 
model is estimated using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315, ‐61) window. Winner is a dummy variable equal to one (zero) if a politician wins 
(loses) a close gubernatorial election. A close election is specified by the margin of votes between the winner and the loser being less than 
5%. All regressions control for the quadratic polynomials of vote share of winners and vote share of losers, as prescribed by the regression 
discontinuity design, and state and year fixed effects. Column (1) presents results on the standard model with the winning margin of 5%. 
Column (2) controls for industry fixed effects. Column (3) controls for characteristics of politicians (age, gender, election turnout, and party 
affiliation). Column  (4) controls  for director characteristics  (age, gender, and  inside/independent directorship). Column  (5) controls  for 
firm characteristics (logarithm of market capitalization, Tobin's Q, return on asset, and leverage). Column (6) controls for poll prediction. 
Column  (7)  excludes observations with CAR  larger  than  10%. Columns  (8) and  (9)  respectively  report  the  results on  the  subsamples of 
winners and losers.  
 
Dependent Variables: CAR (‐1,1)       
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9) 
Subsample  5% Margin  5% Margin  5% Margin  5% Margin  5% Margin  5% Margin    Outliers Excluded  Winners  Losers 
                               
Winner  0.0389  0.0419  0.0218  0.0420  0.0356  0.0373    0.0274 
[0.00833]***  [0.0103]***  [0.00912]**  [0.0110]***  [0.00878]***  [0.0102]***    [0.00511]*** 
 
Intercept    0.0114  ‐0.0127 
  [0.0056]**  [ 0.0061]** 
 
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
                   
Controls  State and Year FE 
State, Year 
and Industry 
FE 
State, Year and 
Politicians' 
Characteristics  
State, Year and 
Director 
Characteristics 
State, Year and Firm 
Characteristics  
State, Year 
and Poll 
Prediction 
  State and Year FE     
 
R‐squared  0.045  0.140  0.064  0.103  0.054  0.045    0.115  0.006  0.007 
Observations  586  586  586  579  507  532    547  357  229 
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Table 3: Candidate Characteristics and the Value of Political Connections 
This  table  reports OLS  regressions of  the  cumulative  abnormal  returns  (CARs)  among  the politically  connected  firms  around  close 
gubernatorial elections in the U.S. between 1999 and 2010. A firm is defined as politically connected if one of its directors and a close 
election’s  candidate  graduate  from  the  same  university  program  within  a  year.  Each  observation  pairs  a  connected  firm  to  the 
connected candidate’s close election. Average abnormal returns are estimated based on the market model around the election day (Day 
0). The market model is estimated using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315,‐61) window. Winner is a dummy variable equal to one (zero) if a 
politician wins (loses) a close gubernatorial election. A close election  is specified by the margin of votes between the winner and the 
loser being less than 5%. All regressions control for the quadratic polynomials of the vote share of winners and vote share of losers, as 
prescribed by the RDD, and state and year fixed effects. Columns (1) to (5) respectively show results on the subsamples of incumbents, 
challengers, challenger‐only close elections, and challengers from, and not from federal offices. Standard errors in square brackets are 
corrected for clustering by state. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
                 
Dependent Variables: CAR (‐1,1) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Subsample  Incumbents  Challengers  Challenger‐only Elections  Challenger from Federal Offices 
Challenger not from 
Federal Offices 
                 
Winner  0.0225  0.0491  0.0491  0.0103  0.0493 
[0.00001]***  [0.0120]***  [0.0120]***  [0.00001]***  [0.00852]*** 
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls  State and Year FE  State and Year FE  State and Year FE  State and Year FE  State and Year FE 
R‐squared  0.104  0.045  0.047  0.034  0.063 
Observations  58  528  469  92  436 
                 
Δ  ‐0.0266**  ‐0.0390*** 
χ2  5.46  22.48 
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Table 4: State Corruption and the Value of Political Connections 
This  table  reports OLS  regressions of  the  cumulative  abnormal  returns  (CARs)  among  the politically  connected  firms  around  close 
gubernatorial elections in the U.S. between 1999 and 2010. A firm is defined as politically connected if one of its directors and a close 
election’s  candidate  graduate  from  the  same  university  program  within  a  year.  Each  observation  pairs  a  connected  firm  to  the 
connected candidate’s close election. Average abnormal returns are estimated based on the market model around the election day (Day 
0). The market model is estimated using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315,‐61) window. Winner is a dummy variable equal to one (zero) if a 
politician wins (loses) a close gubernatorial election. A close election  is specified by the margin of votes between the winner and the 
loser being less than 5%. All regressions control for the quadratic polynomials of the vote share of winners and vote share of losers, as 
prescribed by the regression discontinuity design, and year fixed effects. Columns (1) to (6) respectively show results on the subsamples 
of  above  or  below  median  of  the  following  measures:  ALD  1970  score  of  isolation  of  the  state  capital  (Campante  and  Do  2014), 
corruption news (Saiz and Simonsohn 2013, Campante and Do 2014), and corruption conviction rate (Glaeser and Saks 2006). Standard 
errors  in  square  brackets  are  corrected  for  clustering  by  state.  *,  **,  and  ***  denote  statistical  significance  at  10%,  5%,  and  1%, 
respectively. 
                    
Dependent Variables: CAR (‐1,1) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Subsample  Low ALD  High ALD  Less Corruption News  More Corruption News  Less Conviction  More Conviction 
                    
Winner  0.00668  0.0466  ‐0.00686  0.0290  0.0136  0.0407 
[0.00914]  [0.0152]***  [0.0195]  [0.00588]***  [0.0103]  [0.0105]*** 
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
           
Controls  Year FE  Year FE  Year FE  Year FE  Year FE  Year FE 
R‐squared  0.006  0.045  0.008  0.018  0.009  0.057 
Observations  331  250  247  236  424  162 
                    
Δ  ‐0.0399**  ‐0.0359*  ‐0.027*** 
χ2  5.46  3.48  9.95 
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Table 5: Firm characteristics and the Value of Political Connections 
This  table  reports OLS  regressions of  the  cumulative  abnormal  returns  (CARs)  among  the politically  connected  firms  around  close 
gubernatorial elections in the U.S. between 1999 and 2010. A firm is defined as politically connected if one of its directors and a close 
election’s  candidate  graduate  from  the  same  university  program  within  a  year.  Each  observation  pairs  a  connected  firm  to  the 
connected candidate’s close election. Average abnormal returns are estimated based on the market model around the election day (Day 
0). The market model is estimated using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315, ‐61) window. Winner is a dummy variable equal to one (zero) if 
a politician wins (loses) a close gubernatorial election. A close election is specified by the margin of votes between the winner and the 
loser being less than 5%. All regressions control for the quadratic polynomials of the vote share of winners and vote share of losers, as 
prescribed by the regression discontinuity design, and state and year fixed effects. Columns (1) to (4) respectively show results on the 
subsamples in the cross‐section of size (below or above median market capitalization) and with or without reliance on external finance 
(Rajan  and  Zingales  1998).  Columns  (5)  and  (6)  respectively  show  results  on  subsamples  of  firms  with  below  and  above median 
abnormal trading activity (Campbell and Wasley 1996). Standard errors  in square brackets are corrected  for clustering by state. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
              
                 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Subsample  Small Firm  Large Firm 
Rely on External 
Finance 
Not Rely on 
External Finance 
High Abnormal 
Trading Activity 
Low Abnormal 
Trading Activity  
              
Winner  0.0558  0.0133  0.0533  0.0146  0.0551  0.0102 
[0.0150]***  [0.0136]  [0.0119]***  [0.00917]  [0.0151]***  [0.0167] 
   Vote Share 
(Winners) and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
   Controls  State and Year FE  State and Year FE  State and Year FE  State and Year FE  State and Year FE  State and Year FE 
     
R‐squared  0.063  0.123  0.055  0.287  0.198  0.119 
Observations  292  294  426  145  293  293 
Δ  0.0425*  0.0387**  0.0449** 
χ2  3.52  5.03  4.66 
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Table 6: Social Network Characteristics and the Value of Political Connections 
 
This  table  reports  OLS  regressions  of  the  cumulative  abnormal  returns  (CARs)  among  the  politically  connected  firms  around  close 
gubernatorial elections  in  the U.S. between  1999 and 2010. A  firm  is defined as politically connected  if one of  its directors and a close election’s 
candidate graduate  from  the  same university program within a year. Each observation pairs a connected  firm  to  the connected candidate’s close 
election. Average abnormal returns are estimated based on the market model around the election day (Day 0). The market model is estimated using 
daily data over a 255‐day (‐315, ‐61) window. Winner is a dummy variable equal to one (zero) if a politician wins (loses) a close gubernatorial election. 
A close election  is specified by the margin of votes between the winner and the  loser being  less than 5%. All regressions control for the quadratic 
polynomials of  the vote  share of winners and vote  share of  losers, as prescribed by  the  regression discontinuity design, and  state and year  fixed 
effects. Panel A reports the effects of connections by the strength of school networks. Columns (1) to (8) of Panel A respectively show results on the 
subsamples of alumni who graduate from the same university program within the same year, within one to five years, within 10 years, and within 20 
years. Panel B shows school‐specific effects of connections. Columns (1) to (6) of Panel B respectively present results on subsamples of connections 
through  Ivy League  and non‐Ivy League networks, network  size  (below or  above  the  average numbers of directors  in  in BoardEx universe),  and 
alumni whose last reunion is held in election year or not. Standard errors in square brackets are corrected for clustering by state. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 Panel A. Strength of School Networks 
   Dependent Variables: CAR (‐1,1) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Subsample  Within 0Y  Within 1Y  Within 2Y  Within 3Y  Within 4Y  Within 5Y  Within 10Y  Within 20Y 
                         
Winner  0.0630  0.0389  0.0197  0.00768  ‐0.000736  ‐0.00388  ‐0.00369  ‐0.00427 
  [0.0197]***  [0.00833]***  [0.00845]**  [0.00871]  [0.00824]  [0.00865]  [0.00474]  [0.00384] 
 Vote Share 
(Winners) and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                 
Controls  State and Year FE  State and Year FE 
State and Year 
FE 
State and Year 
FE 
State and Year 
FE 
State and Year 
FE 
State and Year 
FE 
State and Year 
FE 
 
R‐squared  0.193  0.045  0.026  0.023  0.019  0.019  0.013  0.015 
Obs  228  586  974  1,311  1,659  1,995  3,602  5,632 
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Panel B. School‐Specific Effects, Network Size, Network Distance, and the Value of Political Connection  
            
   Dependent Variables: CAR (‐1,1) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Subsample  Ivy League  Non‐Ivy League  Large Networks  Small Networks  Reunion Year  Non‐reunion Year 
             
Winner  0.00540  0.0443  0.0214  0.0443  0.0349  0.00913 
  [0.0000]***  [0.0189]**  [0.0000]***  [0.0189]**  [0.00526]***  [0.00198]*** 
         
Vote Share 
(Winners) and Vote 
Share (Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
Controls  State and Year FE  State and Year FE  State and Year FE  State and Year FE  State and Year FE  State and Year FE 
         
R‐squared  0.029  0.126  0.034  0.123  0.094  0.107 
Obs  320  266  321  265  183  302 
                    
Δ  ‐0.0389**  0.0229  0.0258*** 
χ2  4.8  1.67  22.8 
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Table 7: Firm Headquarters and Operations in the Election State and the Value of Political Connections 
This  table  reports  OLS  regressions  of  the  cumulative  abnormal  returns  among  the  politically  connected  firms  around  close 
gubernatorial elections  in  the U.S. between  1999 and 2010. A  firm  is defined as politically connected  if one of  its directors and a close election’s 
candidate graduate  from  the  same university program within a year. Each observation pairs a connected  firm  to  the connected candidate’s close 
election. Average abnormal returns are estimated based on the market model around the election day (Day 0). Winner is a dummy variable equal to 
one (zero) if a politician wins (loses) a close gubernatorial election. A close election is specified by the margin of votes between the winner and the 
loser being less than 5%. All regressions control for the quadratic polynomials of the vote share of winners and vote share of losers, as prescribed by 
the regression discontinuity design, and state and year fixed effects. Column (1) shows results on subsamples of firms with activities in a given state in 
a given year, measured as the ratio of the number of search hits for the firm's name in local newspapers and the number of search hits for the neutral 
keyword "September," as in Campante and Do (2014). Column (2) reports results on firms with operations in the election state, based on the Garcia 
and Norli (2012) measure of state operational presence across time, and supplemented with OneSource data. Column (3) reports results on firms that 
are headquartered in the election state with Compustat’s states of firm headquarters, corrected using the Heider and Ljungqvist (2014) method. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
           
Dependent Variable: CAR (‐1,1) 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Subsample  Some Media Mention Prior to Election  Garcia and Norli (2012) State Presence  Same HQ‐Election State 
           
Winner  0.0330  0.0470  0.0281 
[0.00907]***  [0.0246]*  [0.000001]*** 
Vote Share 
(Winners) and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls  State and Year FE  State and Year FE  State and Year FE 
R2  0.062  0.186  0.775 
Observations  409  187  30 
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Table 8: Political Connections and Corporate Outcomes 
This  table  reports OLS  regressions  of  the  change  in  corporate  outcomes  among  the politically 
connected firms following close gubernatorial elections in the U.S. between 1999 and 2010. A firm 
is defined as politically connected if one of its directors and a close election’s candidate graduate 
from the same university program within a year. Each observation pairs a connected firm to the 
connected  candidate’s  close  election.  Winner  is  a  dummy  variable  equal  to  one  (zero)  if  a 
politician wins (loses) a close gubernatorial election by a margin of votes between the winner and 
the loser of less than 5%. All regressions control for the quadratic polynomials of the vote share of 
winners and vote share of  losers, as prescribed by the regression discontinuity design, and state 
and year fixed effects. Panel A reports change in corporate investments, defined as the difference 
in  logarithm of corporate  investment  in year N versus year N‐1.  Investments are measured  in a 
given  year  as  the  sum  of  capital  expenditure  and  research  and  development  expenditure 
normalized  by  start‐of‐the‐year  total  assets.  Columns  (1)  to  (5)  of  Panel  A  show  respectively 
results on corporate  investments from one year before to three years after the election. Column 
(1) and (2) of Panel B show results in the change in log of the dollar value of a firm’s procurement 
contracts and assistance  in a 2‐year period after election as compared  to a 2‐year period before 
election,  respectively, with  state‐level and  federal‐level procurement. Columns  (3)  to  (4)  report 
the  effects  of  connections  on  the  probability  to  receive  procurement  contracts  or  government 
assistance after the election on two subsamples of firms headquartered and not headquartered in 
the election state. Standard errors  in square brackets are corrected  for clustering by state. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Panel A: Corporate Investments  
     
Dependent Variables:  Δ Log(Firm Investing Activities) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Window  Years: (‐2,‐1)  (‐1,0)  (0,1)  (1,2)  (2,3) 
                 
Winner  0.0339  ‐0.241  ‐0.050  0.407  0.121 
[0.131]  [0.162]  [0.146]  [0.181]**  [0.139] 
Vote Share 
(Winners) and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Controls 
State and Year 
FE 
State and Year 
FE 
State and Year 
FE 
State and Year 
FE 
State and Year 
FE 
R‐squared  0.065  0.091  0.128  0.101  0.100 
Observations  468  466  480  463  442 
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Panel B: Procurement and Government Funding 
           
Dependent Variable:  Δ Log(Dollar Value)  Δ Indicator 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Subsample  State  Federal  Same HQ‐Election State 
Different HQ‐
Election State 
              
Winner  1.863  0.573  0.0106  ‐0.0607 
[0.0000]***  [0.387]  [0.0000]***  [0.0777] 
Vote Share 
(Winners) and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
Controls 
State and Year 
FE 
State and Year 
FE  State and Year FE  State and Year FE 
   
R‐squared  0.793  0.184  0.566  0.112 
Observations  24  211  30  556 
Δ  0.0713 
χ2  1.04 
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Table 9: Homophily 
This  table  reports OLS  regressions  of  the Cumulative Abnormal Returns  among  the politically 
connected firms around close gubernatorial elections in the U.S. between 1999 and 2010. A firm is 
defined as politically connected  if one of  its directors and a close election’s candidate graduate 
from the same university program within a year. Each observation pairs a connected firm to the 
connected  candidate’s  close  election.  Average  abnormal  returns  are  estimated  based  on  the 
market model around the election day (Day 0). The market model  is estimated using daily data 
over a 255‐day (‐315,‐61) window. Winner  is a dummy variable equal to one (zero)  if a politician 
wins  (loses)  a  close gubernatorial  election. A  close  election  is  specified by  the margin of  votes 
between  the winner and  the  loser being  less  than 5%. All  regressions control  for  the quadratic 
polynomials of the vote share of winners and vote share of losers, as prescribed by the regression 
discontinuity  design,  and  state  and  year  fixed  effects.  Columns  (1)  to  (9)  control  for  various 
interacted fixed effects. WinSchool is a dummy equal to one if any politician from a specific school 
wins  in  a  specific  election.  WinIndustry  is  a  dummy  equal  to  one  if  a  winning  politician  is 
connected to a firm in the industry. Industry is a firm’s two‐digit SIC code. Time since graduation 
decade  is  the number of decades  since a politician graduates  from a  school. Standard errors  in 
square brackets are corrected for clustering by state. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
  
   Dependent Variables: CAR (‐1,1) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Subsample  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin 
         
Winner  0.0264  0.0410  0.0319  0.0253 
  [0.0000]***  [0.01053]**  [0.01352]***  [0.00479]** 
         
Vote Share 
(Winners) and Vote 
Share (Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Controls 
School FE x 
TimeGrad Decade FE 
x WinSchool, 
State FE, and Year FE 
Industry FE x 
WinIndustry,  
State FE, and Year FE 
Industry FE x Size 
Quintile FE x 
WinIndustry,  
State FE, and Year FE 
(1) and (2) 
         
R‐squared  0.125  0.1425  0.3677  0.231 
Obs  586  586  586  586 
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Table 10: Falsification and Placebo Tests 
 
This  table reports  falsification and additional  tests. A  firm  is defined as politically connected  if one of  its 
directors and a close election’s candidate graduate  from  the same university program within a year. Each 
observation pairs a connected firm to the connected candidate’s close election. Winner is a dummy variable 
equal to one (zero) if a politician wins (loses) a close gubernatorial election with a margin of votes between 
the winner and the loser of less than 5%. CARs are calculated around the election day (day 0), based on the 
market  model  using  daily  data  from  day  ‐315  to  day  ‐61.  Each  column  runs  a  local  cubic  polynomial 
regression of  the dependent  variable on  vote  shares  in  the  subsamples  above  and below  the  cutoff,  and 
reports the difference between the predicted values of the dependent variable for each subsample around 
the cutoff. Panel A shows several falsification tests. Column (1) shows the benchmark regression at 50% of 
the  vote  share  threshold.  Columns  (2)  to  (5)  show  results  with  different  hypothetical  cutoffs.  Panel  B 
presents the additional tests. All regressions control for the vote share of winners and vote share of losers, 
as prescribed by  the RD Design. The outcome  variable CAR  is  calculated using different models: Fama‐
French model in columns (1) and (2); Fama‐French model with momentum in columns (3) and (4); and raw 
returns  in  columns  (5) and  (6). Columns  (7)  to  (8)  collapse  the data  so  that each unit of observation  is 
respectively a director, or a company. Standard errors in brackets are corrected for clustering by state. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: RDD with Non‐Parametric Regressions and Tests 
              
  Dependent Variables: CAR (‐1,1) 
  (1)    (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)    Benchmark    Placebo Thresholds 
Cutoff  50%     48%  49%  51%  52% 
             
Winner  0.0227    0.0100  0.0037  ‐0.0066  0.1044 
  [0.0113]**    [0.0326]  [0.0119]  [0.0100]  [0.0671]                     
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  Panel B: Additional Robustness Checks 
                            
Dependent 
Variable: 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
FF  FF  FFM  FFM  Raw  Raw  Politician‐Level 
Director‐
Level 
Company‐
Level 
Two‐Way 
Clustering 
Sample  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin        5% margin 
                               
Winner  0.0386  0.0351  0.0352  0.0318  0.0419  0.0351  0.0407  0.0415  0.0373  0.0389 
[0.0087]***  [0.0000]***  [0.0074]***  [0.0000]***  [0.0101]***  [0.0000]***  [0.0222]*  [0.0087]***  [0.0077]***  [0.0136]*** 
               
Vote Share 
(Winners) and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
               
Controls  State and Year FE 
State, Year,  
and School FE 
State and Year 
FE 
State, Year, 
and School FE 
State and 
Year FE 
State, Year,  
and School FE 
State and 
Year FE 
State and 
Year FE 
State and 
Year FE 
State and 
Year FE 
               
R‐squared  0.047  0.136  0.040  0.113  0.095  0.184  0.667  0.052  0.039  0.045 
Observations  586  586  586  586  586  586  51  439  552  586 
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Table 11: RDD Randomness Checks 
 
This table reports robustness checks of the near‐randomness of the win/lose treatment  induced 
by close gubernatorial elections between 1999 and 2010. A firm is defined as politically connected 
if one of  its directors and a close election candidate graduate from the same university program 
within  a  year.  Each  observation  pairs  a  connected  firm  to  the  connected  candidate’s  close 
election. Winner  is  a  dummy  variable  equal  to  one  (zero)  if  a  politician wins  (loses)  a  close 
gubernatorial election with a margin of votes between the winner and the  loser of  less than 5%. 
All regressions control for the quadratic polynomials of the vote share of winners and vote share 
of  losers, as prescribed by  the  regression discontinuity design, and  state and year  fixed effects. 
Each column serves to show that a dependent variable's distribution  is continuous at the cutoff 
point of 50% vote share. These dependent variables are those used as control variables in Tables 2 
to 7 in the main text. Panel A shows results for politicians’ characteristics (gender, age, logarithm 
of election turnout, incumbency, poll margin of win, and party affiliation.) Panel B reports results 
on director characteristics (director gender, age, executive role, and  logarithm of social network 
size.)  Panel  C  exhibits  results  on  state  characteristics  (regulations,  economic  freedom,  state 
employment, corruptions). Panel D reports regressions with firm characteristics (size, Tobin’s Q, 
operating ROA, leverage, financial dependence, same headquarters as the election state dummy, 
measure of operations in election state based on Garcia and Norli (2012), state procurement, and 
investments). Standard errors  in square brackets are corrected  for clustering by state. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
Panel A: Politician Characteristics 
                       
Dependent 
Variable: 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Pol. 
Gender  Pol. Age  Log(Turnout)  Incumbency 
Poll 
Margin 
Of 
Victory 
Party 
Affiliation  Federal 
Experience 
                    
Winner  ‐0.3133  1.636  ‐0.114  ‐0.111  0.007  ‐1.060  0.079 
[0.2862]  [4.715]  [0.244]  [0.323]  [0.0127]  [1.067]  [0.374] 
Vote Share 
(Winners) 
and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
           
R‐squared  0.172  0.049  0.119  0.065  0.056  0.098  0.092 
Observations  51  51  51  51  51  51  51 
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B. Director Characteristics 
              
Dependent 
Variable: 
(1)  (2)    (3) 
Director's Gender  Director's Age    Log(Count of Institution) 
             
Winer  ‐0.0306  3.006    ‐0.577 
[0.0902]  [4.278]    [1.064] 
 
Vote Share 
(Winners) and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes  Yes    Yes 
       
R‐squared  0.027  0.110    0.049 
Observations  439  433    439 
 
C. State Characteristics 
           
Dependent Variable: 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
ALD 1970  Convictions  Corruption News 
           
Winner  0.0762  ‐1.334  ‐291.6 
[0.0582]  [6.694]  [162.2]* 
Vote Share 
(Winners) and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
     
R‐squared  0.045  0.036  0.187 
Observations  581  586  483 
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D. Firm Characteristics 
                                
Dependent 
Variable: 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Market 
Capitalization  TobinQ 
Operating 
ROA  Leverage 
Dependence 
on External 
Finance 
Same 
HQ‐
Election 
State 
Firm 
Activities 
Prior to 
Election 
Garcia 
and Norli 
(2012) 
State 
Presence 
Procurement  Investing Activities 
                       
Winner  ‐0.101  0.252  ‐0.176  0.0442  0.150  ‐0.0575  ‐0.225  ‐0.221  0.0224  0.453 
[0.527]  [0.225]  [0.197]  [0.0414]  [0.352]  [0.129]  [0.119]*  [0.146]  [0.0140]  [0.310] 
Vote Share 
(Winners) 
and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
R‐squared  0.023  0.008  0.010  0.007  0.012  0.048  0.023  0.028  0.007  0.017 
Observations  586  552  512  547  571  586  586  586  586  474 
 
 
